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No. 84-1667 
BETHEL SCH. DIST. No. 403, et al. Cert to CA9 (NorrisL ~ 
(§1983 deft) Goodwin; [Wffcili t [dis]) ~) /l . .. 
v. ?t-J. v. rL D ~ 
FRASER, et al. ~  Fed./Civ. 
(Sl983 plntf) / ~ / ~ 
1. SUMMARY: Petr c l a i ms' that the LCs erred in holding 
that it violated the First Amendment by disciplining resp for ~-------- .,··· -- ___, 
a speech given at a school asse~bly. ____::: ___ ,__.._..__...,_._ 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: On Apr. 26, 1983, resp 
Mathew Fraser, then a 
~ 1-
~· r:: .-... ~ ·- - - - .. • -··"!'. __ .., __ _ 
It 
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High School, a member of the Honor Society and the Debate Team 
and the recipient of the "Top Speaker Award" in statewide 
debate championships for two consecutive years, gave the 
following "nominating speech" for a friend running for school - - ~
office. The speech was given during a student-run assembly 
conducted on school grounds during school hours: 
"I know a man who is firm--he's firm in 
his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his 
character is firm--but most of all, his belief 
in you, the students of Bethel is firm. 
"Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes h i s 
oint and u ds it in. If necessary, he'll 
taKe a issue an nail it to the wall. He 
doesn't attack things in spurts--he drives 
hard, pushing and pushing until finally--
succeeds. 
"Jeff is a man who will go to the very 
end--even the climax, for each and every one 
of you. ~
"So vote for Jeff for ASB vice president-
-he'll never come between you and the best our 
high school can be." 
The record showed that the 600 odd students and teachers 
listening to the speech reacted, inter alia, by "whooping and 
hollering," and that one student was seen simulating 
masturbation and two others were seen simulating sexual ----intercourse by moving their hips. Three or four teachers 
wrote the school principal that they considered the speech 
"inappropriate," and others testified that they had to spend 
class time the following day discussing the speech. The 
following day resp was called into the Assistant Principal's 
office and notified that he was being charged with violating 
the school's "disruptive conduct rule," which states: 
"In addition to the criminal acts defined 
above, the commission of, or participation in 
- .,. •••. ~ ... ,- .- - - •."!' •"" ,- - ·~""'" "·"'lo- - - - ·~-~ . .._-- ;"'!•-.. -·- .. - ... - . .... -
i-<~ 
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certain noncriminal activities or acts may 
lead to disciplinary action. Generally, these 
are acts which disrupt and interfere with the 
educational process. 
. . . . 
"Disruptive conduct. Conduct which 
materially and substantially interferes with 
the educational process is prohibited, 
including the use of obscene, profane language 
or gestures." 
After a h:~ g at which resp admitted to deliberately ~ 
usingE~to _:hock an~ interest ~~ a;1dience, r~ 
was suspended for three days and his name was removed from a 
previously approved list of candidates for graduation speaker. 
Resp was nevertheless elected one of the graduation speakers 
by a write-in vote, but the school denied him permission to 
speak. After exhausting administrative remedies, resp brought -a §1983 action in FDC, seeking to have the school district 
required to allow him to speak at graduation. The DC agreed 
..,.._.,,,... 
with resp. It found that the school district's actions in 
---:-1' 
punishing resp violated the First Amend_JDent, that the 
"disruptive conduct" rule was unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad, and sua sponte, found that the imposition of the 
suspension violated a Washington State statute. The court 
entered an injunction requiring the school district to allow 
resp to speak at graduation, and resp so spoke. The DC also 
awarded $278 in damages and $12,700 in costs and attorney's 
fees. 
On appeal the CA9 affirmed with one judge dissenting. 
Essentially, the court found that the school district had 
lit violated resp's First Amendment rights by disciplining him for 
the speech he gave. The court began its analysis with a 
- -- 4 -
general discussion of First Amendment principles, noting that 
a high school student retains First Amendment rights inside 
✓ 
the school, see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969}, but also noting that a 
student's First Amendment rights inside a school are not 
~ ____, 
absolute. The s~ h, of course, was not obscene under this 5~ 
Court's standard. The court rejected three specific arguments ~ 
raised by petr in favor of its ability to discipline resp for 
his speech. 
(1) The CA9 rejected the district's argument that resp 
could be disciplined because his speech had a disruptive 
/ 
effect on the school's educational process. Although Tinker 
states that student speech is not protected if it "materially 
• disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder" in a 
school, here the evidence submitted by the petr was 
insufficient to establish such disruption. The "hooting and 
yelling," was not an uncommon reaction from students, and the 
expressive conduct of 3 out of 600 students did not show 
substantial disruption. The CA9 also rejected as evidence of 
disruption the facts that certain teachers had written to the 
principal indicating that they considered the speech 
"inappropriate," and that other teachers had spent class time 
the following day discussing the speech. The CA9 reasoned 
that the disruption shown could not distinguish the case 
elf4 
~ 
from ,r  
'---~ LA'JA.. 
la 
Tinker. Finally, the CA9 rejected testimony by school 
officials that in their view the fact that the speech was 
"inappropriate" meant that it was "disruptive." "The mere 
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fact that some members of the school community considered 
[resp's] speech to be inappropriate does not necessarily mean 
that it was disruptive of the educational process." --(2) The CA9 then rejected the district's argument that it /Y1--Cf- f 
~~ 
The could discipline resp because his speech was "indecent." 
fact that school officials consider certain speech offensive 
is not enough to allow them to censor it. The CA9 rejected 
the District's reliance on FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, in 
which this Court upheld an FCC rule banning a broadcast of 
George Carlin's "filthy words" monologue. Pacifica was 
distinguishable because of its reliance on a "captive 
audience" analysis and because it relied on the fact that the 
broadcasting would reach unsupervised children. Here, the CA9 
reasoned, "a high school assembly is a very public place," 
especially when convened for the purpose of providing a forum 
for students to make campaign speeches. "Realistically, high 
school students are beyond the point of being sheltered from 
the potpourri of sights and sounds we encounter at every turn 
in our daily lives." School officials cannot be allowed 
"unbridled discretion" to determine whether a particular 
speech is "indecent," and thereby to control the speech of 
high school students; this "would increase the risk of 
cementing white, middle class standards for determining what 
is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our public 
schools." 
(3) The CA9 also rejected petr's argument that school 
offici~ls generally may control language used to convey ideas 
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at school-sponsored events. Essentially, the CA9 found that 
this assembly was a 
therefore was "extra-curricular." The fact that attendance at 
the assembly was "voluntary" made this case like Board of 
Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, which 7 01ved the censorship 
of books in a high school library. In Pico this Court noted 
that students were exposed to the books only through 
"voluntary inquiry," and were not a captive audience. "In 
exercising his First Amendment rights at the assembly, [resp] 
was as free to express himself as if the students had 
organized a campaign rally in the cafeteria or outside on the 
school steps." "Just as in the political world outside the 
school, the First Amendment requires that the principal 
restraint on the choice of words and ideas and political 
dialogue is the risk of disapproval by the audience the 
speaker hopes to influence." 
Finally, the majority dropped a footnote in which it 
agreed with the DC's decision that the school's misconduct 
rule was constitutionally infirm, because "on its face it 
permits a student to be disciplined for using speech 
considered to be 'indecent' even when engaged in an extra-
curricular activity.• 1 
1The CA9 did not address the DC's ruling that the suspension 
ordered violated Washington state law. Although the CA9's 
failure to address this non-constitutional ground might raise 
Ashwander problems such as those confronted at argument in United 
--
States v. Albertini, I do not believe that such problems would be 
a reason for denying cert. Even assuming the state law ground 
Footnote continued on next page • 
..- . • •. r• -• ~ . ... -- ~•• ...,. 4 ..,, "'" . ..., .4 .. -,.-.-... --.• · .... ._- --r- --:--· • •---~"'" : ... _~,_ ..... . _ •---.. _ ----·· 
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He noted that the majority 
school authorities powerless to discipline a _________________________ __, 
student who makes crude and indecent remarks during a school 
assembly, and that the majority opinion further held that 
school authorities were required to allow such a student to 
give the address at school commencement exercises. The thrust 
of Judge Wright's disagreement was with the majority's failure 1"t,,,d 
to 9~ ?1'.L. deference or discretion to scho~-:::~ ~ 
dealing with the speech of students inside the school; he 
noted that this Court has recognized that the school context -1-o~~ 
cannot be treated the same for purposes of defining individ~ 
liberties as can events occurring outside the school. See New ~ 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 s.ct. 733. In addition, Judge Wright 
disagreed with the majority on the facts; the only finding ~ 
~ 
showed that attendance at the assembly was mandatory , in the /)'IA-~ 
sense that a student must either attend the assembly or study 
hall; the audience therefore was a captive one. ---_-----~"----------- :,: He also noted that student government campaigns clearly were part of the 
educational process, and that the speech occurred during 
school hours on school grounds and could not be described as 
•extra-curricular." Judge Wright questioned the applicability 
of Tinker, inasmuch as Tinker dealt with restraints on "pure 
was at all valid, it only went to one form of relief that was 
afforded; an injunction was also granted and the fees and costs 
which keep this case alive probably were awarded as much for 
prevailing on the injunction as for prevailing with respect to 
~ the suspension. 
• 
~ 
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speech," and not restraints on the use of indecent language to 
present ideas. He thus found the decision in FCC v. Pacifica 
useful. School officials, in their capacity in !Q.£2 parentis ,(}~ 
and also as inculcators of societal values, must be given ~ 
great leeway to determine what speech would be disruptive and 
indecent for 14-to-18 year olds required to sit through a high 
school assembly. The federal courts should as a general 
matter refrain from second-guessing such decisions. 
Finally, Judge Wright indicated his disagreement with the 
majority's holding that the "disruptive conduct" rule was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. School district rules 
should not be held to the same standards as criminal statutes; 
here the regulation gave fair notice of what was prohibited. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr for the most part echoes Judge 
Wright's dissent. The CA9's decision creates "a novel First 
Amendment 'right' for students to express themselves in a 
sexually offensive and indecent manner." This Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that local school boards and school 
officials should have broad discretion to regulate the conduct TL.{)_ 
of students. See New Jersey v. T.L.O.; Board of Education v. 
Pico. The CA9's decision equates the regulatory authority of --
local school boards with the authority of state and local 
officials to suppress speech in a public forum. But this 
Court has indicated that in the school context school 
officials may regulate speech as long as their particular 
action does not indicate an intent to impose political 
orthodoxy upon students. See Board of Education v. ~-
' • "' -~ - :- -- ,. .~ ,., .. r --.-..~:----c;- ......... ~ -- .... ~-,-~.- - ~- r:--- ·-.• - -- - ..,. ~ ,.,. __ _ • .,,. •. ~ --: - • ~ ·- ........ - . ..,. - - - .,... ·- - .. I 
• 
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In addition, petr argues that by determining that school 
officials cannot define "indecent" speech the CA9 has rendered 
the officials powerless to regulate any such activity, because 
it would be impractical to draw up detailed regulations 
describing what speech is considered "indecent." Finally, 
petr urges this Court to grant cert to review the CA9's 
decision that the school's disciplinary rules are vague and 
overbroad; the CA9 has departed from decisions of this Court 
and other courts indicating that such rules are not subject to 
the same vagueness and overbreadth attacks as criminal 
statutes. 
4. DISCUSSION: I think that Judge Wright and petrs have 
the better of this argument, and in addition I believe the 
~
case is probably certworthy. One can begin with the _____. 
proposition that if resp had given his speech on a stump in 
public park it would have been fully protected without 
reaching the conclusion that the CA9 reaches here. And it 
goes without saying that one does not have to agree that the 
speech was "offensive" or that the sanctions were warranted. 
Petr and Judge Wright seem quite correct that, although the 
majority makes passing references to broader regulatory 
authority in school officials, the majority nevertheless 
treats this speech--which was given during school hours on 
a/~ 
school grounds as part of a school-sponsored student 
government campaign--as if the school officials had no 
C II 4 
more ~ .J.-o 
/'JU~ 
~I--~ LA-power to regulate speech inside a school than do state 
officials outside it. ------ ~ ~-~~ ~-~ 
~~~­
- ~ ~ 
-- - ·~· .. . .. ~.ir:- - , , . - · •• .,, -., --,-- -- .. -.• -- .,. -- . •-. ":' --.,...~-.. 
• 
- -- 10 -
I think there is more to this case, however, than a mere 
failure to follow this Court's precedents. A review of the 1 ~/-
cases indicates that k hi s case falls in a void\ between Tinker,  
Pacifica, T.L.O., and Pico; this Court has never really dealt 
with the authority of school officials to regulate speech that 
is neither purely political nor unprotected, but is merely 
offensive, and Judge Wright may be correct in suggesting that 
the Tinker "substantial disruption" test is inapt. It does 
not take much imagination to think of speech that students 
might engage in that would be protected on the street but that 
one would think could be regulated in the classroom, whether 
or not the speech "substantially disrupted" the educational 
process under the CA9's application of that test. Cf. Cohen 
v. California. This problem is highlighted by the CA9's 
rather summary conclusion that the school rule preventing use 
of "profane" language--which seems to be equated with 
"indecent" language--is void for vagueness. And the notion \ / 
that a school must allow~ student who has given such a speech r I 
also to give a graduation speech seems questionable indeed. 
There is no square conflict, although petr points to 
cases indicating that school disciplinary rules should not be 
assessed under standard vagueness or overbreadth analysis. 
There is a factual dispute which detracts somewhat from the 
case's certworthiness, but the CA9 seems to have gone outside 
the record in determining that the assembly was "voluntary" 
and "extra-curricular." The case is not moot because resp has 
given his graduation speech; there still is a dispute over 
~ 
..... ~ ·--·~ - ,.. .,.. - ... ... .. ..... . . -~ ·-~-- ~. ~ "" - .-, - ~. - -_. .. .,. ,.. •. - - -- . .... -~ 
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damages, costs and attorneys' fees. In sum, I think the lower 
court opinion is probably wrong, and I also think that this 
case presents important issues on which this Court has not 
really spoken. 
I recommend CFR with an eye toward grant. 2 
'Ph@r@ is na Response~ . 
May 10, 1985 Englander opin in petn 
2r note that if cert is granted there certainly is no need 
•
to grant on question 4--"did the District Court err in raising 
and deciding issues of state law sua sponte •••• " 
- -eptember 30, 1985 Court v'oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ... ..... .......... . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 84-1667 
Submitted ............... . , 19 .. . Announced .. . ............ . , 19 .. . 
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No.84-1667 Bethel School District v. Fraser[e~/t 9) 
Bob 
To be argued, Monday, March 3, 1986 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Whether the First Amendment prohibited school officials from 
punishing a student for a speech at an assembly replete with sex-----
ual innuendo. 
Whether the high school disciplinary rule in question is 
unconstitutionally vague . 
• 
• 
- - page 2. 
Whether the school's failure to define each specific form of 
disciplinary action that could be imposed on a student violated 
due process. 
Whether the DC erred in raising and deciding issues of state 
law sua sponte. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In April of 1983 respondent Matthew Fraser was a 17 year-old 
high school senior attending Bethel High School, a public school 
operated by the petr. Fraser spoke on behalf of a candidate for 
vice president of the Associated Student Body at an all-school 
assembly that took place during school hours and was attended by 
approximately ~~ students. Students were required to attend 
either the assembly or a study hall. 1 There was hooting and 
~ -yelling during the speech, and three students were observed to be 
simulating sexual acts. The next day, several teachers corn-------
plained, others reported disruption of their classes due to stu-
dent reaction. The day after the speech petr was informed that 
he had violated the school's disruptive conduct code. 2 He was 
1The entire text of the speech was: 
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his 
shirt, his character is firrn--but most of all, his belief in you, 
the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes 
his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and 
nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts, he 
drives hard, pushing and pushing and pushing until fin~l ity--he 
succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end--den the 
climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for ASB 
Vice President--he'll never come between you and the best our 
high school can be. 
2That code provides: Disruptive Conduct: Conduct which 
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given copies of the letters of complaint, and a chance to explain 
himself. He was informed that he would be suspended for three 
days and that his name would be removed from consideration as a 
candidate for graduation speaker at the upcoming graduation cere-
mony. 
After appealing to the school board, 
~ 
resp, joined by his 
father as guardian ad litem, brought a §1983 action in DC. The 
✓Dc ruled after a one-half day hearing that (1) the suspension 
violated Fraser's rights of free expression under the First 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, (2) the school's disrup-
tive conduct rule was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad, 
(3) the failure of the disciplinary rule to specify removal of 
names from the candidates' list for graduation violated due proc-
ess, (4) sua sponte, the state court ruled that the suspension 
violated state law. The Court also announced an injunction re-
quiring the school district to allow resp to speak at the Bethel 
school commencement exercises. A permanent injunction and dam-
ages, o followed in later orders. The 
✓ CA9 aff irmea in an opinion that relies heavily on this Court's 
opinion in~ nker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 
U.S. 503, 506 {1969). 
II. DISCUSSION 
In Tinker, this Court noted that a student "may express his 
opinions ... if he does so without materially and substantially ---· interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in 
the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights -------------
0 f others." Id., at 513 {quotation omitted). On one level this 
• 
• 
- - page 4. 
case is distinguishable from Tinker in that Tinker dealt with 
pure 1 olitica~ eech. Nonetheless, analysis of this case must 
begin with the proposition that a reversal here cannot be squared - - ,,__ 
with the Indeed, it hardly appears that the 
petrs or SG think it can be, thus, their attempts to suggest oth-
er possible standards to be applied. To uphold the suppression 
of speech here under Tinker would require a view of "material, 
substantial interference" with discipline that renders the stand-
ard analytically useless. The SG's argument that this standard 
was not central to the holding of Tinker is unpersuasive. Thus, 
✓ 
in order to reverse the CA9, the Tinker standard, with respect to 
the showing made by a school board, must be reexamined. 
The Tinker standard is inapp ro~ te because it is overbroad 
in 
is order and disci 
~
is a view that a school's primary interest 
e, and that once this is achieved, the 
school has little interest in whatever else a student may choose 
to do or say provided it does not interfere with the rights of 
others. Schools then, are akin to local police who have an in-
terest only in domestic tranquillity. The primary function of a 
school, however, is to teach, and in carrying out that teaching 
'------------
function it may choose to discipline behavior for reasons wholly 
~ ----- ~ 
unconnected to its disruptive character. For better or for 
worse, schools do serve a b r i ti cal socializing 
\,\ 
function. See 
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (Opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.). When viewed from this perspective it may be en-
tirely consistent with the function of the school and, indeed in 
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speech containing sexual innuendo, or to deny a student run news-
paper the right to publish, for example, an article that is a 
scathing satire of the physical attributes of the faculty. The 
SG points out that a speech including racial or religious slurs ---------
sh.Q.u.ld be able to be suppressed without requiring a showing of 
'-
disruption. Respondents address this point by assuming that such --speech could be suppressed because it would inevitably lead to 
disruption. First, that is simply not clear; consider a school 
with a small or virtually nonexistent minority population; sec-
ond, the example demonstrates the silliness of a standard that 
focuses solely on some "disruption" of the educational process. 
Once the function of the school is recognized as something 
broader than, and more amorphous t~han, maintaining order, the 
competence of a federal judge to decide when students should be 
able to speak and what they should be able to say is called into 
question. Thus, surely one factor influencing the Court in a 
decision such as this is which societal institution is better 
equipped to safeguard First Amendment principles while carrying 
out the educational mission. Clearly the school board is such an 
entity. Nor is the school board unaccountable; unpopular acts 
that cannot easily be challenged in a court can be challenged at 
the ballot box. Indeed, even the plurality in Pico recognized 
---------------
that courts should not "intervene in the resolution of conflicts 
which arise in the daily operation of school systems unless basic 
constitutional values are directly and sharply implicated in 
those conflicts." Id., at 866 (quotation omitted). 
• 
• 
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Although the Tinker standard may be overbroad, it would be 
error to remove the supervisory power of the courts al together 
from decisions made in schools with respect to fundamental 
rights. This is so because left totally to their own devices 
school officials may fall prone to the temptation, often suc-
cumbed to by those in power, to censor speech for reasons that 
have nothing to do with the educating function. 
The approach of the SG provides a sort of middle ground. He 
-------------
proposes that: 
Regulation of student speech in the high school 
environment should be permitted if officials have a 
reasonable basis for the regulat ion grounded in the 
main t e nance of an a t mo~fiere o'f c i v 'i li ty- or t he trans-
miss i on of basic societal values, so long - as the regu-
lations d"on'ot;" as i n "T inker, 'suppress student expres-
sion of a particular viewpoint • 
The advantage of a standard such as this is that it leaves 
the vast majority of day-to-day decisions to school authorities, 
but leaves room for litigation when a student suspects that a 
~ . 
school has gone too far. Petr complains that the standard could 
be used to impose the narrow, arbitrary views of a particular 
community on student speech. Arguably, however, a rule based on 
those standards would not be one relating to "basic societal val-
ues." In addition, r-e-s-ps argue that the "particular viewpoint" 
portion of the test is meaningless. They argue that here, Fraser 
was in his manner of speaking taking a particular viewpoint about 
the school administration. I think there is room within this 
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~ 
critical of a school administration, 7,ould be punished for 
the manner in which he chose to do it. In addition, the resps 
parade of horribles such as the censorship of Melville, etc, can 
be handled under the "reasonableness" prong of the standard. The 
reasonableness standard would serve to require the board to make 
some showing, but would not place the same burdens on a school 
board in the unique school setting that are placed on the state 
when it enacts criminal ordinances. These are fine lines, but the 
SG' s standard does, at least, foreclose litigation in the vast 
majority of day-to-day situations in which students need to be 
disciplined. Finally, the SG's standard at least moves closer to 
the core values of the First Amendment in protecting discussion 
of public concern, rather than the adolescent antics engaged in 
:--------) 
here. 4 
I think that such a deferential rule is justified in the --------- .. 
context of supervised school activities with an educational com-
~--------
ponent for several reasons. ~ , schools perform a unique 
1-t-~ 
3Respondents suggest that PQ-Er was indeed punished for his 
views about the administration. As evidence they suggest that 
others who had written or said similarly "indecent" things were 
not punished. On remand, the Court of Appeals would presumably 
be free to consider such a claim. I note, however, that the 
irony of respondents' position is that in order to control some 
speech, a school is required to control a lot more. 
4A good argument can be made that the school in this case 
should be estopped from enforcing the rule here because three 
-; teachers saw the speech in advance and did not rohibit it. It 
is ur m xe gna o sen as u ent to let him deliver a 
speech and then punish him for it. It is not clear on the 
( 
record, however, that these teachers had the authority--without 
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function, as noted above. Second, students are minors. Third, 
~ -
simply because an activity does not take place in a classroom 
does not mean that its attachment to learning is nil.5 Finally, 
the resps proposition that the school should be allowed to censor 
all indecent language, is in reality a rule that precludes any 
and all judicial review, not a standard. 
A second issue in this case involves a challenge based on 
overbreadth and vagueness to the school's disruptive conduct 
rule. I think the CA9's holding with respect to this rule should 
be reversed because schools deserve flexibility in writing and 
applying their rules, and the rule here is reasonably clear in 
detailing the kind of conduct prohibited. School rules need not 
be treated like er iminal statutes. Indeed, under the standard 
set forth above, it is difficult to see how the rule covers the 
content of speech relating to a particular viewpoint. If there 
comes a time when the rule is so used, a challenge under the 
above standard can be brought. 
Finally, I agree with the petitioner that the issue relative 
to whether the school could bar petr from the speech is moot. 
Respondent asserts that the damages awarded were based solely on 
5 Suppose a school board decided that one purpose of student 
council was to promote public speaking habits, and then decided 
that all speeches given must be grammatically correct, or pre-
approved by an advisor. I find it hard to believe that a school 
could not do this. Yet, excessive court interference into the 
day-to-day operations of schools would not lead to freer speech, 
but arguabl y_ to greater restrictions placed by schools to avoid 
the outs1de1 nt ert erence. f ndeed, ~a school might decide that 
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the loss of two days' value of school, not on the lost right to 
speak. I also agree that the issue of whether the DC should have 
addressed the state law should not be decided because the CA9 did 
not decide it. It may also be moot, as the incident is over and 
it is not clear to me that this finding could support damages 
under §1983. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Under the standard set forth by the SG, I believe that the ( 
school had a reasonable basis for disciplining the conduct here. 
I recommend that you reverse the judgment of the CA9 • 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
-
May 16, 1986 
No.84-1667 Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser 
This opinion contains some unfortunately broad language 
that, I think, would not be in it if you had written it, arid 
which, I think, detracts from the central point to be made by a 
case such as this. 
1. I cannot see why it is necessary or proper to say things 
such as "Once the speech was given it became imperative for the 
{f) school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils 
that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with 
the 'fundamental values' of public school education." See also 
p. 7: "The essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be 









and conduct such as 
- page 2. 
that engaged in by this misguided 
misses by making such broad state-- ...... "'"""--..., 
ments (suggesting a "duty" on the part of the school board to -
act) is that respondent should lose because school boards are 
--, -~-------
better situated to make judgments about appropriate conduct than 
are fed er al courts. A school board may have decided to ignore 
Fraser's speech, and I do not think a court could have intervened 
in that event. The opinion, then, in seeming to support the 
school board, actually strikes a blow to decentralized decision-,, ~ 
making by suggesting that the board had a duty to do what it did. - ---- - - WO ,,,,._. -----I think the case could have been resolved simply by saying 
that this is not nondisruptive political speech of the sort en-
gaged in by Tinker, and that while in some cases the line betwee 9 
Tinker and Fraser might blur, this is a case where the school fdif'-., 
board is free to decide whether discipline is necessary and what 
that discipline should be. The school board has this authority 
because the public school does have the role of inculcating val---
ues, and in a case such as this, it is up to the school board, 
and not a federal court, to decide how that should be done. 
2. The sentence: "Such speech has no claim to First Amend-
ment protection," on p. 9 is far too broad and potentially dan-
gerous unless confined to the setting of a high school assembly 
as here, and is a sentence that should be deleted, or qualified. 
3.I note that no one has as yet joined the opinion, and you 
may want to wait to see whether anyone objects to any of the 
above before joining, or you may want to have me spell out and 
~ - - page 3. 
circulate the above problems in greater detail in an attempt to 
have some changes made. 
4. I still think the result reached by the chief is the cor-
rect one, and note that the opinion is good insofar as it leaves 
the Tinker protections in place for political speech. 
• -
May cl9, 1986 
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84-1667 Bethel School District v. Fraser 
Dear Chief: 
1 agree, of course, with the result reached by your 
opinion for the Court. 1 also think the opinion correctly 
and satisfactorily distinguishes Tinker as protected politi-
cal speech. 
My concern relates to language in the opinion that 
can be read as imposing a nauty" on the part of a school 
board to take action in cases such as this. For example, 
the draft states that "it became imperative for the school 
to disassociate itself [from this speech} to make the point 
to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly 
inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school 
education." P. 9. In addition, the draft states: 
•The essential lessons of civil, mature con-
a ~ duct cannot be conveyed in the school that 
tolerates lewd, indecent or offensive speech 
and conduct such as that indulged in by this 
m misguided boy." (p. 7) • 
While 1 agree with the sentiments you express, I do 
not think this Court should say that a school must impose 
discipline. Perhaps because 1 served for eleven years on 
the Richmond School Board, I would write the opinion in 
terms of the Board's authority to discipline respondent as 
distinguished from an obligation or duty to do so. 
There will be close questions as to whether the lan-
guage used by a student requires discipline, and the facts 
and circumstances can vary widely. In this case, for exam-
ple, although 1 think the Board clearly acted correctly, I 
would not hold that the Board had a duty to impose disci-
pline. All we really need to decide is that the speech was 
not political (as in Tinker), and therefore respondent's 
First Amendment rights were not violated when the School 
Board exercised its reasonable discretion. 
' !. 
- -
1 probably will write a brief concurring opinion to 
make the above distinction explicitly clear. 
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
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Jla,gqinghttt. ~- OJ. 2tlffe'!~ 
May 19, 1986 
84-1667 -
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
;4~~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
j 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUST ICE 
PERSONAL 
- -
.iu.p:rttttt (ijltltrl ot t4t ~~ .itaftg 
,rrudpn:ghtn, 1fJ. QJ. 2llffe~ .;l 
May 20, 1986 
84-1667 Bethel School District v. Fraser 
Dear Lewis: 
I could probably accommodate most of your concerns if you do 
not write. However, if you intend to wr i te there is reason for 
my trying to meet your point. 
I agree that there is no issue on whether there is a duty on 
the school to act, but you can be damnesl.,~ure that if I had a 
teenager in school and the authorit1 es "'"ie't *fh is pass I'd 
castigate them as wholly incompetent to serve in their positions. 
But I'll "soften" the dictum if it will save writing. 
{J;i (D 
Justice Powell 
. ~ ~ ,n. - d.-1-t:_ " r ~ ~ J ;u_ j~ // 
,,Lr+f. ~ 
- ·-
May 20, 1986 
PERSONAL 
84-1667 Bethel School District v. Fraser 
Dear Chief: 
I'll gladly await your second draft. 
a Sincerely, 
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From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: MAY 2 3 /.Qfll; 
Recirculated: ______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1667 
BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 403, ET AL., PETI-
TIONERS v. MATTHEW N. FRASER, A MINOR AND 
E. L. FRASER, GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the First Amend-
ment prevents a school district from disciplining a high school 
student for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly. 
I 
A 
On April 26, 1983, respondent Matthew N. Fraser deliv-
ered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elec-
tive office at the Bethel High School in Bethel, Washington. · 
Approximately 600 high school students, many of whom were 
14 year olds attended the assembly. Although attendance 
was not mandatory, the assembly was held during school 
hours and on school property, as part of a school-sponsored 
educational program in self-government. Students who 
elected not to attend the assembly were required to report to 
study hall. During the entire speech, Fraser referred to his 
candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sex-
ual metaphor. 
Prior to delivering his speech, Fraser discussed the con-
templated remarks with several of his teachers. Two of 
them informed him that the speech was "inappropriate and 
that he probably should not deliver it," (J. A. at 30) and that 
" - -
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his delivery of the speech might have "severe consequences." 
J. A. at 61. 
During Fraser's delivery of the speech, a school counselor 
observed the reaction of students to the speech. Some stu-
dents hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simu-
lated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respondent's 
speech. Other students appeared to be bewildered and em-
barrassed by the speech. One teacher reported that on the 
day following the speech, she found it necessary to forego a 
portion of the scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the 
speech. Joint Appendix at 41-44. 
A Bethel High School disciplinary rule prohibiting the use 
of obscene language in the school provides: 
Conduct which materially and substantially interferes 
with the educational process is prohibited, including the 
use of obscene, profane language or gestures. 
The morning after the assembly, the Assistant Principal 
called Fraser into her office and notified him that the school 
considered his speech to have been a violation of this rule. 
Fraser was presented with copies of five letters submitted by 
teachers, describing his conduct at the assembly; he was 
given a chance to explain his conduct, and he admitted to hav-
ing given the speech described and that he deliberately used 
sexual innuendo in the speech. Fraser was then informed 
that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name 
would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation 
speaker at the school's commencement exercises. 
Fraser sought review of this disciplinary action through 
the school district's grievance procedures. The hearing offi-
cer determined that the speech given by respondent was "in-
decent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of 
many of the students and faculty in attendance at the assem-
bly. " The examiner determined that the speech fell within 
the ordinary meaning of "obscene," as used in the disruptive 
conduct rule, and affirmed the discipline in its entirety. 
- -
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Fraser served two days of his suspension, and was allowed to 
return to school on the third day. 
B 
Respondent, by his father as guardian ad litem, then 
brought this action in the United States District Court for 
the Wes tern District of Washington. Respondent alleged a 
violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech 
and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court held that the 
school's sanctions violated respondent's right to freedom of 
speech under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, that the school's disruptive conduct rule is un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal 
of respondent's name from the graduation speaker's list vio-
lated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the disciplinary rule makes no mention of such re-
moval as a possible sanction. The District Court awarded 
respondent $278 in damages, $12,750 in litigation costs and 
attorneys fees, and enjoined the School District from pre-
venting respondent from speaking at the commencement 
ceremonies. Respondent, who had been elected graduation 
speaker by a write-in vote of his classmates, delivered a 
speech at the commencement ceremonies on June 8, 1983. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court, Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 755 F. 2d 1356 (1985), holding that re-
spondent's speech was indistinguishable from the protest 
armband in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). The court explicitly rejected the 
School District's argument that the speech, unlike the pas-
sive conduct of wearing a black armband, had a disruptive ef-
fect on the educational process. The Court of Appeals also 
rejected the School District's argument that it had an inter-
est in protecting an essentially captive audience of minors 
from lewd and indecen.t language in a setting sponsored by 
- -
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the school, reasoning that the school board's "unbridled dis-
cretion" to determine what discourse is "decent" would "in-
crease the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards 
for determining what is acceptable and proper speech and be-
havior in our public schools." 755 F. 2d, at 1363. Finally, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the School District's argument 
that, incident to its responsibility for the school curriculum, it 
had the power to control the language used to express ideas 
during a school sponsored activity. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1985). We 
reverse. 
II 
This Court acknowledged in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969) 
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gates." The 
Court of Appeals read that case as precluding any disciplin~ 
of Fraser for indecent speech and lewd conduct in the school 
assembly. That court appears to have proceeded on the the-
ory that the use of lewd and obscene speech in order to make 
what the speaker considered to be a point in a nominating 
speech for a fellow student was essentially the same as the 
wearing of an armband in Tinker as a form of protest or the 
expression of a political position. 
The marked distinction between the political "message" of 
the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respond-
ents speech in this case seems to have been given little 
weight by the Court of Appeals. In upholding the students' 
right to engage in a non-disruptive, passive expression of a 
political viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful to note 
that the case did "not concern speech or action that intrudes 
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students." 
393 U. S., at 508. 
It is against this background that we turn to consider the 
level of First Amendment protection accorded to Fraser's ut-
- -
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terances and actions before an official high school assembly 
attended by six hundred students. 
III 
The role and purpose of the American public school system 
was well described by two historians, saying "public educa-
tion must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic . ... 
It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values 
in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to 
the practice of self-government in the community and the na-
tion." C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic History of the 
United States 228 (1968). In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 
68, 76-77 (1979), we echoed the essence of this statement of 
the objectives of public education as the "inculcat[ion] funda-
mental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system." 
These fundamental values of "habits and manners of civil-
ity" essential to a democratic society must, of course, include 
tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even 
when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these 
"fundamental values" must also take into account consider-
ation of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, 
the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom 
to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and 
classrooms carries with it a responsibility to keep the plane of 
debate out of the gutter. Even the most heated political dis-
course in a democratic society requires consideration for the 
personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences. 
In our nation's legislative halls, where some of the most 
vigorous political debates in our society are carried on, there 
are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other 
participants in the debate. The Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the 
House of Representatives to govern the proceedings in that 
body, prohibits the use of "impertinent" speech during de-
bate and likewise provides that "[n]o person is to use inde-
- -
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cent language against the proceedings of the House." J ef-
ferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, §§ 359, 360, 
reprinted in Manual and Rules of House of Representatives, 
House Doc. No. 271, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 158-159 (1982); see 
id., at 111 n. a (Jefferson's Manual governs the House in all 
cases to which it applies). The Rules of Debate applicable in 
the Senate likewise provide that a Senator may be called to 
order for imputing improper motives to another Senator or 
for referring offensively to any State. See Senate Proce-
dure, S. Doc. No. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. Rule XIX at 
568-569, 588-591 (1981). Senators have been censured for 
abusive language directed at other senators. See Senate 
Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1793 to 1972, S. 
Doc. 92-7, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 95-98 (1972) (Senators 
McLaurin and Tillman); id., at 152-153 (Senator McCarthy). 
Can it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is 
acceptable in a school assembly of teenagers? 
The First Amendment guarant~es wide freedom in matters 
of adult public discourse. A sharply divided Court upheld 
the right to express an anti-draft viewpoint in a public place, 
albeit in terms highly offensive to most citizens. See Cohen 
v. California , 403 U. S. 15 (1971). It does not follow, how-
ever, that simply because the use of an offensive form of ex-
pression may not be prohibited to adults making what the 
speaker considers a political point, that the same latitude 
must be permitted to children in a public school. In New 
Jersey v. T. L. 0., -- U. S. --, -- (1985), we reaf-
firmed that the constitutional rights of students in public 
school are not automatically co-extensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings. As cogently expressed by Judge 
Newman, "the First Amendment gives a high school student 
the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Co-
hen's jacket." Thomas v. Board of Education, 607 F. 2d 
1043, 1057 (CA2 1979) (Newman, J. , concurring). 
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school ( 
education to prohibit ~ the use of vulgar and offensive 
- -
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terms in public discourse. Indeed, that the "fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system" disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive 
or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution I 
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of ex-
pression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The in-
culcation of these values is truly the "work of the school." 
Tinker, 398 U. S., at 508; see Ambach v. Norwick, supra. 
The determination of what manner of speech is inappropriate / 
properly rests with the school board. 
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public 
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civ-
ics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of 
a civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teach-
ers-and indeed the older students-demonstrate the appro-
priate form of civil discourse and political expression by their 
conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, 
like parents, they are role models. Students who express 
their views without rudeness or lewdness and practice civil-
ity, however boisterous or vigorous their speech, demon-
strate respect for the rights and privacy of others. The 
State may determine that the essential lessons of civil, ma-
ture conduct cannot be conveyed in the school that tolerates 
lewd, indecent or offensive speech and conduct such as that 
indulged in by this confused boy. 
The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was 
plainly offensive to both teachers and students-indeed to 
any mature person. By glorifying male sexuality, and in its 
verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting to teenage 
girl students. See Joint Appendix at 77-81. The speech 
could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, 
many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of 
awareness of human sexuality. Some students were re-
ported as bewildered by the speech and the reaction of mim-
icry it provoked. 
- -
84-1667-0PINION 
8 BETHEL SCHOOL DIST. No. 403 v. FRASER 
This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowl-
edged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the 
speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech 
is sexually explicit and the audience may include children. 
In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968) this Court up-
held a New York statute banning the sale of sexually ori-
ented material to minors, even though the material in ques-
tion was entitled to First Amendment protection with 
respect to adults. And in addressing the question whether 
the First Amendment places any limit on the authority of 
public schools to remove books from a public school library, 
all members of the Court, otherwise sharply divided, ac-
knowledged that the school board has the authority to re-
move books that are vulgar. Board of Education v. Pico, 
457 U. S. 853, 871-72 (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 
879-881 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring); id., at 918-920 
(JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting). These cases recognize 
the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school au-
thorities acting in loco parentis to protect children-espe-
cially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually ex-
plicit, indecent, or lewd speech. 
We have also recognized an interest in protecting minors 
from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language. In 
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U. S. 726 (1973), we dealt with the power of the 
Federal Communications Commission to regulate a radio 
broadcast described as "indecent but not obscene." There 
the Court reviewed an administrative condemnation of the 
radio broadcast of a self-styled "humorist" _who described his 
own performance as being in "the words you couldn't say on 
the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't 
say ever." Id., at 729; see also id., at 751-755 (appendix). 
The Commission concluded "that certain words depicted sex-
ual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner, 
and noted that they were broadcast at a time when children 
were 'undoubtedly in ~he audience.'" The Commission is-
- -
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sued an order declaring that the radio station was guilty of 
broadcasting indecent language in violation of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1464. Id., at 732. The Court of Appeals set aside the 
Commission's determination, and we reversed, reinstating 
the Commission's citation of the station. We concluded that 
the broadcast was properly considered "obscene, indecent, or 
profane" within the meaning · of the statute. The plurality 
opinion went on to reject the radio station's assertion of a 
First Amendment right to broadcast vulgarity: 
"These words offend for the same reason that obscen-
ity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice 
Murphy when he said: '[S]uch utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight so-
cial value as a step to truth that any benefit that may de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social in-
terest in order and morality.' Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 355 U. S., at 572." 438 U. S. at 746. 
. We hold that petitioner acted entirely within its permissi-
ble authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response 
to his offensively lewd and indecent speech. Unlike the 
sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tin-
ker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any 
political viewpoint. By offering a vulgar and lewd speech 
under the transparent guise of a student political campaign, 
these utterances and the conduct they provoked undermined 
the school's basic educational mission. A high school assem-
bly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue 
directed towards a captive audience of teenage students. 
Such speech has no claim to First Amendment protection. 
Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the school to l 
disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar 
speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the "fun-
damental values" of public school education. Justice Black, 
dissenting in Tinker, supra, made a point that is especially 
relevant in this case: 
- -
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"I wish therefore, to disclaim any purpose ... to hold 
that the federal Constitution compels the teachers, par-
ents and elected school officials to surrender control of 
the American pubic school system to public school stu-
dents." 393 U. S., at 522, 526. 
IV 
Respondent contends that the circumstances of his suspen-
sion violated due process because he had no way of knowing 
that the delivery of the speech in question would subject him 
to disciplinary sanctions. This argument is wholly without 
merit. We have recognized that "maintaining security and 
order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in 
school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the 
value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher 
relationship." New Jersey v. T. L. 0., -- U. S. --, --
(1985). Given the school's need to be able-to impose discipli-
nary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct dis-
ruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary 
rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes 
criminal sanctions. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 
161 (1974) (JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring). Two days 
suspension from school does not rise to the level of a penal 
sanction calling for the full panoply of procedural due process 
protections applicable to a criminal prosecution. Cf. Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). The school disciplinary rule 
proscribing "obscene" language and the pre-speech admoni-
tions of teachers gave adequate warning to Fraser that his 
lewd speech could subject him to sanctions.* 
*Petitioners also challenge the ruling of the District Court that the re-
moval of Fraser's name from the ballot for graduation speaker violated his 
due process rights because that sanction was not indicated as a potential 
punishment in the school's disciplinary rules. We agree with the Court of 
Appeals that this issue has become moot, since the graduation ceremony 
has long since passed and Fraser was permitted to speak in accordance 
with the District Court's injunction. No part of the damage award was 
- -
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
is 
Reversed. 
APPENDIX TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT 
The following is a transcript of the speech delivered by re-
spondent at the school assembly. 
"I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's 
firm in his shirt, his character is firm-but most of all, 
his belief in you, the students of Bethel is firm. 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds 
it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the 
wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts, he drives 
hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the cli-
max-for each and every one of you. 
So vote for Jeff for ASB vice president-he'll never 
come between you and the_ best our high school can be. " 
Joint Appendix at 47. 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the First Amend-
ment prevents a school district from disciplining a high school 
student for giving a lewd speech at a school assembly. 
I 
A 
On April 26, 1983, respondent Matthew N. Fraser deliv-
ered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elec-
tive office at the Bethel High School in Bethel, Washington. 
Approximately 600 high school students, many of whom were 
14 year olds attended the assembly. Although attendance 
was not mandatory, the assembly was held during school 
hours and on school property, as part of a school-sponsored 
educational program in self-government. Students who 
elected not to attend the assembly were required to report to 
study hall. During the entire speech, Fraser referred to his 
candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sex-
ual metaphor. · 
Prior to delivering his speech, Fraser discussed the con-
templated remarks with several of his teachers. Two of 
them informed him that the speech was "inappropriate and 
that he probably should not deliver it," (J. A. at 30) and that 
·- - -
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his delivery of the speech might have "severe consequences." 
J. A. at 61. 
During Fraser's delivery of the speech, a school counselor 
observed the reaction of students to the speech. Some stu-
dents hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simu-
lated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respondent's 
speech. Other students appeared to be bewildered and em-
barrassed by the speech. One teacher reported that on the 
day following the speech, she found it necessary to forego a • 
portion of the scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the 
speech. Joint Appendix at 41-44. 
A Bethel High School disciplinary rule prohibiting the use 
of obscene language in the school provides: 
Conduct which materially and substantially interferes 
with the educational process is prohibited, including the 
use of obscene, profane language or gestures. 
The morning after the assembly, the Assistant Principal 
called Fraser into her office and notified him that the school 
considered his speech to have been a violation of this rule. 
Fraser was presented with copies of five letters submitted by 
teachers, describing his conduct at the assembly; he was 
given a chance to explain his conduct, and he admitted to hav-
ing given the speech described and that he deliberately used 
sexual innuendo in the speech. Fraser was then informed 
that he would be suspended for three days, and that his name 
would be removed from the list of candidates for graduation 
speaker at the school's commencement exercises. 
Fraser sought review of this disciplinary action through 
the school district's grievance procedures. The hearing offi-
cer determined that the speech given by respondent was "in-
decent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of 
many of the students and faculty in attendance at the assem-
bly." The examiner determined that the speech fell within 
the ordinary meaning of "obscene," as used in the disruptive 
conduct rule, and affirmed the discipline in its entirety. 
- -
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Fraser served two days of his suspension, and was allowed to 
return to school on the third day. 
B 
Respondent, by his father as guardian ad litem, then 
brought this action in the United States District Court for 
the Wes tern District of Washington. Respondent alleged a 
violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech 
and sought · both injunctive relief and monetary damages 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court held that the 
school's sanctions violated respondent's right to freedom of 
speech under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, that the school's disruptive conduct rule is un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the removal 
of respondent's name from the graduation speaker's list vio-
lated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the disciplinary rule makes no mention of such re-
moval as a possible sanction. The District Court awarded 
respondent $278 in damages, $12,750 in litigation costs and 
attorneys fees, and enjoined the School District from pre-
venting respondent from speaking at the commencement 
ceremonies. Respondent, who had been elected graduation 
speaker by a write-in vote of his classmates, delivered a 
speech at the commencement ceremonies on June 8, 1983. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court, Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 755 F . 2d 1356 (1985), holding that re-
spondent's speech was indistinguishable from the protest 
armband in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dis-
trict, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). The court explicitly rejected the 
School District's argument that the speech, unlike the pas-
sive conduct of wearing a black armband, had a disruptive ef-
fect on the educational process. The Court of Appeals also 
rejected the School District's argument that it had an inter-
est in protecting an essentially captive audience of minors 
from lewd and indecent language in a setting sponsored by 
- -
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the school, reasoning that the school board's "unbridled dis-
cretion" to determine what discourse is "decent" would "in-
crease the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards 
for determining what is acceptable and proper speech and be-
havior in our public schools." 755 F. 2d, at 1363. Finally, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the School District's argument 
that, incident to its responsibility for the school curriculum, it 
had the power to control the language used to express ideas 
during a school sponsored activity. 
We granted certiorari, -- U.S. -- (1985). We 
reverse. 
II 
This Court acknowledged in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969) 
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gates." The 
Court of Appeals read that case as precluding any discipline 
of Fraser for indecent speech and lewd conduct in the school 
assembly. That court appears to have proceeded on the the-
ory that the use of lewd and obscene speech in order to make 
what the speaker considered to be a point in a nominating 
speech for a fellow student was essentially the same as the 
wearing of an armband in Tinker as a form of protest or the 
expression of a political position. 
The marked distinction between the political "message" of 
the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respond-
ents speech in this case seems to have been given little 
weight by the Court of Appeals. In upholding the students' 
right to engage in a non-disruptive, passive expression of a 
political viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful to note 
that the case did "not concern speech or action that intrudes 
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students." 
393 U. S., at 508. 
It is against this background that we turn to consider the 
level of First Amendment protection accorded to Fraser's ut-
- -
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terances and actions before an official high school assembly 
attended by six hundred students. 
III 
The role and purpose of the American public school system 
was well described by two historians, saying "public educa-
tion must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . 
It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values 
in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to 
the practice of self-government in the community and the na-
tion." C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic History of the 
United States 228 (1968). In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 
68, 76-77 (1979), we echoed the essence of this statement of 
the objectives of public education as the "inculcat[ion] funda-
mental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system." 
These fundamental values of "habits and manners of civil-
ity'' essential to a democratic society must, of course, include 
tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even 
when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these 
"fundamental values" must also take into account consider-
ation of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, 
the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom 
to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and I 
classrooms must be balanced -against the society's counter-
vailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of so-
cially appropriate behaviour. Even the most heated political 
discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for 
the personal sensibilities of the other participants and 
audiences. 
In our nation's legislative halls, where some of the most 
vigorous political debates in our society are carried on, there 
are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other 
participants in the debate. The Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the 
House of Representatives to govern the proceedings in that 
- -
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body, prohibits the use of "impertinent" speech during de-
bate and likewise provides that "[n]o person is to use inde-
cent language against the proceedings of the House." J ef-
ferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, §§ 359, 360, 
reprinted in Manual and Rules of House of Representatives, 
House Doc. No. 271, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 158-159 (1982); see 
id., at 111 n. a (Jefferson's Manual governs the House in all 
cases to which it applies). The Rules of Debate applicable in 
the Senate likewise provide that a Senator may be called to 
order for imputing improper motives to another Senator or 
for referring offensively to any State. See Senate Proce-
dure, S. Doc. No. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. Rule XIX at 
568-569, 588-591 (1981). Senators have been censured for 
abusive language directed at other senators. See Senate 
Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1793 to 1972, 
S. Doc. 92-7, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 95-98 (1972) (Senators 
McLaurin and Tillman); id., at 152-153 (Senator McCarthy). I 
Can it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is 
beyond the reach of school officials to regulate? 
The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters 
of adult public discourse. A sharply divided Court upheld 
the right to express an anti-draft viewpoint in a public place, 
albeit in terms highly offensive to most citizens. See Cohen 
v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). It does not follow, how-
ever, that simply because the use of an offensive form of ex-
pression may not be prohibited to adults making what the 
speaker considers a political point, that the same latitude 
must be permitted to children in a public school. In New 
Jersey v. T. L. 0 ., -- U. S. --, -- (1985), we reaf-
firmed that the constitutional rights of students in public 
school are not automatically co-extensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings. As cogently expressed by . Judge 
Newman, "the First Amendment gives a high school student 
the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Co-
hen's jacket." Thomas v. Board of Education, 607 F. 2d 
1043, 1057 (CA2 1979) (Newman, J., concurring). 
- -
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Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school 
education to prohibit that the use of vulgar and offensive 
terms in public discourse. Indeed, that the "fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system" disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive 
or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution 
prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of ex-
pression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The in-
culcation of these values is truly the "work of the school." 
Tinker, 398 U. S., at 508; see Ambach v. Norwick, supra. ~ 
The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom j C..., 
or in schoofassembly is inappropriate properly rests with the 
1
I 
school board. - -
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public 
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civ-
ics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of 
a civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teach-
ers-and indeed the older students-demonstrate the appro-
priate form of civil discourse and political expression by their 
conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, 
like parents, they are role models. Students who express 
their views without rudeness or lewdness and practice civil-
ity, however boisterous or vigorous their speech, demon-
strate respect for the rights and privacy of others. The 
State may determine that the essential lessons of civil, ma-
ture conduct cannot be conveyed in the school that tolerates 
lewd, indecent or offensive speech and conduct such as that 
indulged in by this confused boy. 
The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was 
plainly offensive to both teachers and students-indeed to 
any mature person. By glorifying male sexuality, and in its 
verbal content, the speech was acutely insulting to teenage 
girl students. See Joint Appendix at 77-81. The speech 
could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, 
many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of 
awareness of human sexuality. Some students were re-
- -
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ported as bewildered by the speech arid the reaction of mim-
icry it provoked. 
This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowl-
edged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the 
speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech 
is sexually explicit and the audience may include children. 
In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968) this Court up-
held a New York statute banning the sale of sexually ori-
ented material to minors, even though the material in ques-
tion was entitled to First Amendment protection with 
respect to adults. And in addressing the question whether 
the First Amendment places any limit on the authority of 
public schools to remove books from a public school library, 
all members of the Court, otherwise sharply divided, ac-
knowledged that the school board has the authority to re-
move books that are vulgar. Board of Education v. Pico, 
457 U. S. 853, 871-72 (1982) (plurality opinion); id., at 
879-881 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring); id., at 918-920 
(JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting). These cases recognize 
the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school au-
thorities acting in loco parentis to protect children-espe-
cially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually ex-
plicit, indecent, or lewd speech. 
We have also recognized an interest in protecting minors 
from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language. In 
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U. S. 726 (1973), we dealt with the power of the 
Federal Communications Commission to regulate a radio 
broadcast described as "indecent but not obscene." There 
the Court reviewed an administrative condemnation of the 
radio broadcast of a self-styled "humorist" who described his 
own performance as being in "the words you couldn't say on 
the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't 
say ever." Id., at 729; see also id., at 751-755 (appendix). 
The Commission concluded "that certain words depicted sex-
ual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner, 
- -
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and noted that they were broadcast at a time when children 
were 'undoubtedly in the audience.' " The Commission is-
sued an order declaring that the radio station was guilty of 
broadcasting indecent language in violation of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1464. Id. , at 732. The Court of Appeals set aside the 
Commission's determination, and we reversed, reinstating 
the Commission's citation of the station. We concluded that 
the broadcast was properly considered "obscene, indecent, or 
profane" within the meaning of the statute. The plurality 
opinion went on to reject the radio station's assertion of a 
First Amendment right to broadcast vulgarity: 
"These words offend for the same reason that obscen-
ity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of · First 
Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice 
Murphy when he said: '[S]uch utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight so-
cial value as a step to truth that any benefit that may de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social in-
terest in order and morality.' Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 355 U. S., at 572." 438 U. S. at 746. 
We hold that petitioner acted entirely within its permissi-
ble authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response 
to his offensively lewd and indecent speech. Unlike the 
sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tin-
ker, the penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any 
political viewpoint. The First Amendment does not _E!"event [ Jj 
the school officials fr determining that to perrm1 a vulgar 
an le d c uch as respon en s wou un ermme the 
sch~~io11al m1ssion. A high school assembly 
or classroom is no placelora sexually explicit monologue di-
rected towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage stu- 1 
dents. Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the [ ] 
school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils 
that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent 
with the "fundamental values" of public school education. 
- -
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Justice Black, dissenting in Tinker, supra, made a point that 
is especially relevant in this case: 
"I wish therefore, to disclaim any purpose ... to hold 
that the federal Constitution compels the teachers, par-
ents and elected school officials to surrender control of 
the American pubic school system to public school stu-
dents." 393 U. S., at 522, 526. 
IV 
Respondent contends that the circumstances of his suspen-
sion violated due process because he had no way of knowing 
that the delivery of the speech in question would subject him 
to disciplinary sanctions. This argument is wholly without 
merit. We have recognized that "maintaining security and 
order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in 
school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the 
value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher 
relationship." New Jersey v. T. L. 0., -- U. S. --, --
(1985). Given the school's need to be able to impose discipli-
nary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct dis-
ruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary 
rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes 
criminal sanctions. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 
161 (1974) (JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring). Two days 
suspension from school does not rise to the level of a penal 
sanction calling for the full panoply of procedural due process 
protections applicable to a criminal prosecution. Cf. Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). The school disciplinary rule 
proscribing "obscene" language and the pre-speech admoni-
tions of teachers gave adequate warning to Fraser that his 
lewd speech could subject him to sanctions.* 
*Petitioners also challenge the ruling of the District Court that the re-
moval of Fraser's name from the ballot for graduation speaker violated his 
due process rights because that sanction was not indicated as a potential 
punishment in the school's disciplinary rules. We agree with the Court of 
Appeals that this issue has become moot, since the graduation ceremony 
- -
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
is 
Reversed. 
APPENDIX TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT 
The following is a transcript of the speech delivered by re-
spondent at the school assembly. 
"I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's 
firm in his shirt, his character is firm-but most of all, 
his belief in you, the students of Bethel is firm. 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds 
it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the 
wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts, he drives 
hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the cli-
max-for each and every one of you. 
So vote for Jeff for ASB vice president-he'll never 
come between you and the best our high school can be." 
Joint Appendix at 4 7. 
has long since passed and Fraser was permitted to speak in accordance 
with the District Court's injunction. No part of the damage award was 
based upon the removal of Fraser's name from the list, since damages were 
based upon the loss of two days schooling. 
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At the foot of your opinion, would you please add: 
"JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs in the result." 
The Chief Justice 
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